T
載入中...
載入中...
- Nicolas Maduro's last official meeting was with a Chinese delegation.
馬杜羅最後一次正式會議是與中國代表團會面。
And if you look at the dynamic of that dialogue, it was business as usual.
如果你看那次對話的氣氛，一切如常。
They were exchanging gifts, I think Maduro handed over a horse to celebrate the Chinese New Year.
他們在交換禮物，我記得馬杜羅送了一匹馬來慶祝中國新年。
They were talking about their all-weather friendship and future economic cooperation.
他們談論著全天候的友誼和未來的經濟合作。
And there was no indication that they were aware that an intervention was impending and that Maduro would be removed from power hours later.
沒有任何跡象表明他們知道乾預即將發生，馬杜羅會在幾小時後被趕下臺。
I think this was an intelligence failure on China's part, and the Venezuelan air defense network failed quite spectacularly.
我認為這是中國方面的情報失敗，委內瑞拉的防空網絡也徹底失敗了。
Venezuela reportedly operates an air defense network comprising of Chinese radars and Russian air defense systems, as well as Russian fighter planes.
據報導，委內瑞拉運營著一個由中國雷達、俄羅斯防空系統以及俄羅斯戰鬥機組成的防空網絡。
And the US intervention completely neutralized Venezuela's air defense network, so that it was unable to shoot down any aircraft that the United States used, including slow-moving, non-stealthy, conventional helicopters, which normally are very vulnerable
美國的乾預完全癱瘓了委內瑞拉的防空網絡，以至於它無法擊落美國使用的任何飛機，包括慢速、非隱形的傳統直升機，這些通常非常容易受到
to ground-based missiles and ground-based fire. So I think the pretty spectacular failure of Venezuelan air defense systems should certainly give the leaders in Beijing pause about the effectiveness of their own air defenses
地面飛彈和地面火力的攻擊。所以我認為委內瑞拉防空系統的慘敗肯定會讓北京領導人對他們自己防空系統的有效性產生懷疑，
against American technology and tactics. - For Taiwan, it's a very different scenario in terms of what Beijing's objectives are and their military objectives will be and their political objectives on top of that.
面對美國的技術和戰術。對於臺灣來說，這是一個非常不同的情況，無論是北京的目標、他們的軍事目標還是政治目標。
So I think China has a much bigger problem set than the United States did, so it's very difficult to compare the two.
所以我認為中國面臨的問題比美國要大得多，所以很難比較兩者。
In this case, Taiwan will be the defender and China will be the offensive player on the field, and that's gonna be very challenging for China as well.
在這種情況下，臺灣將是防守方，中國將是進攻方，這對中國來說也將是非常具有挑戰性的。
So even if they studied the lessons of the failure of Venezuelan air defense, that's not necessarily gonna provide them a blueprint for how to defeat Taiwanese integrated air defenses, which are quite formidable.
所以即使他們研究了委內瑞拉防空失敗的教訓，這也不一定能為他們提供如何擊敗臺灣相當強大的整合防空系統的藍圖。
- The Western Hemisphere, this is where we live, and we're not gonna allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States.
西半球是我們生活的地方，我們不會允許西半球成為美國對手、競爭者和敵人的行動基地。
- China has ambitions in Latin America and in the Global South more broadly, and it seeks to lead and be a part of the Global South, integrating its supply chains,
中國在拉丁美洲和更廣泛的全球南方有野心，它尋求領導和成為全球南方的一部分，整合其供應鏈、
its trading networks, it's investments. President Trump's announcement that the US is gonna pursue Western Hemispheric defense doctrine is threatening China to a degree, but there's limits.
貿易網絡和投資。川普總統宣布美國將追求西半球防禦主義，這在一定程度上威脅到了中國，但有其限制。
- Good to see you again. - I think in the big scheme of things, and particularly, looking at the 2026 calendar of bilateral engagements between President Xi and President Trump,
很高興再次見到你。我認為從大局來看，特別是看 2026 年習近平和川普之間的雙邊會談日程，
it's unlikely that this Venezuela intervention is gonna materially affect the tenor and the substance of their engagement.
這次委內瑞拉乾預不太可能實質性地影響他們交往的基調和內容。
I think China has placed a very high priority on stabilizing the US-China relationship, on managing its trade disagreements, and that probably takes a much higher priority.
我認為中國把穩定中美關係、管理貿易分歧放在非常高的優先位置，這可能是更高的優先事項。
I'm not saying there's gonna be a grand bargain between the two, there isn't gonna be spheres of influence in the Western Hemisphere and in the Indo-Pacific, but I think Xi Jinping has priorities,
我不是說兩國之間會達成重大協議，不會有西半球和印太地區的勢力範圍劃分，但我認為習近平有他的優先事項，
and Venezuela is not high amongst them.
而委內瑞拉並不是其中的重點。
點擊句子跳轉到對應位置
- Nicolas Maduro's last official meeting was with a Chinese delegation.
馬杜羅最後一次正式會議是與中國代表團會面。
And if you look at the dynamic of that dialogue, it was business as usual.
如果你看那次對話的氣氛，一切如常。
They were exchanging gifts, I think Maduro handed over a horse to celebrate the Chinese New Year.
他們在交換禮物，我記得馬杜羅送了一匹馬來慶祝中國新年。
They were talking about their all-weather friendship and future economic cooperation.
他們談論著全天候的友誼和未來的經濟合作。
And there was no indication that they were aware that an intervention was impending and that Maduro would be removed from power hours later.
沒有任何跡象表明他們知道乾預即將發生，馬杜羅會在幾小時後被趕下臺。
I think this was an intelligence failure on China's part, and the Venezuelan air defense network failed quite spectacularly.
我認為這是中國方面的情報失敗，委內瑞拉的防空網絡也徹底失敗了。
Venezuela reportedly operates an air defense network comprising of Chinese radars and Russian air defense systems, as well as Russian fighter planes.
據報導，委內瑞拉運營著一個由中國雷達、俄羅斯防空系統以及俄羅斯戰鬥機組成的防空網絡。
And the US intervention completely neutralized Venezuela's air defense network, so that it was unable to shoot down any aircraft that the United States used, including slow-moving, non-stealthy, conventional helicopters, which normally are very vulnerable
美國的乾預完全癱瘓了委內瑞拉的防空網絡，以至於它無法擊落美國使用的任何飛機，包括慢速、非隱形的傳統直升機，這些通常非常容易受到
to ground-based missiles and ground-based fire. So I think the pretty spectacular failure of Venezuelan air defense systems should certainly give the leaders in Beijing pause about the effectiveness of their own air defenses
地面飛彈和地面火力的攻擊。所以我認為委內瑞拉防空系統的慘敗肯定會讓北京領導人對他們自己防空系統的有效性產生懷疑，
against American technology and tactics. - For Taiwan, it's a very different scenario in terms of what Beijing's objectives are and their military objectives will be and their political objectives on top of that.
面對美國的技術和戰術。對於臺灣來說，這是一個非常不同的情況，無論是北京的目標、他們的軍事目標還是政治目標。
So I think China has a much bigger problem set than the United States did, so it's very difficult to compare the two.
所以我認為中國面臨的問題比美國要大得多，所以很難比較兩者。
In this case, Taiwan will be the defender and China will be the offensive player on the field, and that's gonna be very challenging for China as well.
在這種情況下，臺灣將是防守方，中國將是進攻方，這對中國來說也將是非常具有挑戰性的。
So even if they studied the lessons of the failure of Venezuelan air defense, that's not necessarily gonna provide them a blueprint for how to defeat Taiwanese integrated air defenses, which are quite formidable.
所以即使他們研究了委內瑞拉防空失敗的教訓，這也不一定能為他們提供如何擊敗臺灣相當強大的整合防空系統的藍圖。
- The Western Hemisphere, this is where we live, and we're not gonna allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States.
西半球是我們生活的地方，我們不會允許西半球成為美國對手、競爭者和敵人的行動基地。
- China has ambitions in Latin America and in the Global South more broadly, and it seeks to lead and be a part of the Global South, integrating its supply chains,
中國在拉丁美洲和更廣泛的全球南方有野心，它尋求領導和成為全球南方的一部分，整合其供應鏈、
its trading networks, it's investments. President Trump's announcement that the US is gonna pursue Western Hemispheric defense doctrine is threatening China to a degree, but there's limits.
貿易網絡和投資。川普總統宣布美國將追求西半球防禦主義，這在一定程度上威脅到了中國，但有其限制。
- Good to see you again. - I think in the big scheme of things, and particularly, looking at the 2026 calendar of bilateral engagements between President Xi and President Trump,
很高興再次見到你。我認為從大局來看，特別是看 2026 年習近平和川普之間的雙邊會談日程，
it's unlikely that this Venezuela intervention is gonna materially affect the tenor and the substance of their engagement.
這次委內瑞拉乾預不太可能實質性地影響他們交往的基調和內容。
I think China has placed a very high priority on stabilizing the US-China relationship, on managing its trade disagreements, and that probably takes a much higher priority.
我認為中國把穩定中美關係、管理貿易分歧放在非常高的優先位置，這可能是更高的優先事項。
I'm not saying there's gonna be a grand bargain between the two, there isn't gonna be spheres of influence in the Western Hemisphere and in the Indo-Pacific, but I think Xi Jinping has priorities,
我不是說兩國之間會達成重大協議，不會有西半球和印太地區的勢力範圍劃分，但我認為習近平有他的優先事項，
and Venezuela is not high amongst them.
而委內瑞拉並不是其中的重點。